NNA evaluates its dealers, including Nissan Action, in part by calculating “sales penetration.” The NNA expert defines “sales penetration” as “the ratio of a Nissan dealership`s revenue (regardless of where it was licensed) to competitive vehicle registrations in the dealer`s primary market area (LDC), expressed as a percentage.” (Id., e.g. XX for PH-6.) It defines “regional sales penetration” as “the ratio of sales to all Nissan dealers in a region (wherever they are registered) and competitive vehicle registrations in the region, expressed as a percentage.” (ID. to P7.) Given the personal nature of this agreement and its objectives and purposes, the company expressly reserves the right to execute a Ford sales and service contract with individuals or other entities specially selected and approved by the company. The condition and location of the Nissan Action dealership are at the heart of all this action. In the N.O.T., NNA accuses of having repeatedly discussed for years the “abysmal, dilapidated and even dangerous state” of the Nissan Action dealership. (Id., Ex.B to 5.) In particular, NNA recommended that “[Nissan Action] not rebuild the plant at its current site, but move to the automotive retail business in Nanuet, New York.” (Id.) NNA argues that the Nissan action breached RCL`s terms, despite the signing of a letter of relocation of commitment (“RCL”), in which it agreed to act on this recommendation. (Id.) According to the N.O.T., NNA authorized the complainant to “ample opportunity to carry out all necessary renovations and improvements” to his existing dealer. (Id. to 6.) Nevertheless, NNA accuses the applicant of an “infinite delay.” Nissan has disrupted customers and cannot improve Nissan`s brand and image in the market. (Id.) Nissan`s action refutes the fact that the Court of Justice must legally find that it has always maintained respect for facility managers and has made good faith efforts – frustrated by the NNA`s refusal to authorize renovations and delay the authorization of potential removal sites – to repair and relocate the damage.
(Pl. Mem. Supp. Word. It`s Summ. J. at 33-34; Pl. Same answer. Supp. Word.
It`s Summ. J. at 12.) 15 U.S.C 1221 (e). The courts in the second circle found that “good faith” under the ADDCA “has a narrow and limited meaning.” Chrysler Bronx Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 212 F.Supp.2d 233, 245 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (citing Empire Volkswagen, Inc. v. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 814 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.1987)). As the lazar`s Auto Sales, Inc.
court against Chrysler Financial Corp. stated: “First, the complainant must prove that a “car manufacturer” forced, intimidated or threatened him. Second, the applicant must prove that any coercion or intimidation was made to achieve an unlawful purpose. 83, F.Supp.2d 384, 388 (S.D.N.2000); See Empire Volkswagen, 814 F.2d to 95. “[T]he contract is obligatory as a constraint and termination after the fact for omission, otherwise the manufacturer would not be required to insist on reasonable and valid contractual clauses.” Empire Volkswagen, 814 F.2d to 95 (citation Autowest, Inc.